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The precondition for labour-market competition between immigrants and natives is that both 
are willing to accept jobs that do not differ in quality. To test this hypothesis, in this paper we 
compare the working conditions between immigrants and natives in Catalonia. Comparing 
immigrants’ working conditions in relation to their native counterparts is not only a useful 
analysis for studying the extent to which immigrants and low-skilled native workers are direct 
competitors in the labour market, but also allows us to contribute to the literature on this issue 
by moving away from the conventional approach used in previous studies. Our results 
indicate that: i) natives and immigrants display a different taste for job (dis)amenities; ii) 
Catalan-born workers might be in direct competition with EU15 immigrants, while non-
Catalan Spanish workers might be competing with Latin American immigrants, and; iii) 
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1. Introduction 
 
Two majors areas of enquiry in the literature regarding immigration and the labour 
market are: i) how labour market outcomes of native workers are affected by the 
presence of immigrants, and; ii) how host labour markets assimilate immigrant workers. 
The first branch of study looks into the effect of immigration on the employment 
opportunities of native workers (LaLonde and Topel, 1991; Card, 2001; Borjas, 2003), 
on their wages (Friedberg and Hunt, 1995; Pischke and Vellking, 1997; Borjas, 1999; 
Zorlu and Hartog, 2005) and their entrepreneurship activities (Borjas, 1986; Fairlie and 
Meyer, 1996; Basu, 1998; Clark and Drinkwater, 1998; Lofstrom, 2002). The second 
branch, the assimilation theory first introduced by Chiswick in 1978, states that 
immigrants’ wages will tend to converge with their equally qualified native counterparts 
(see also Borjas, 1985). This “catch-up” process is due to the fact that immigrants will 
acquire new skills appropriate to the host labour market. Several studies have also 
focussed on testing this assimilation process in other aspects of the labour market, such 
as the employment opportunities of immigrant workers.  
Since Grossman’s (1982) seminal paper, the degree of substitutability and 
competition in the labour market between natives and immigrants has also received 
considerable attention. Previous international studies suggest that the degree of 
substitution between immigrant and native workers is fairly small. However, the most 
recent evidence is not unequivocal and academic debate on this issue is becoming quite 
controversial (Altonji and Card, 1991; Gang and Rivera-Batiz, 1994; Hamermesh, 1998; 
Card, 2001; Ottaviano and Peri, 2005, 2008; Borjas et al. 2003, 2008). We agree with 
Hammermesh (1998) that the precondition for labour-market competition between 
immigrants and natives is that both are willing to accept jobs that do not differ in   2
quality. On the other hand, if competition does not exist, then immigrants accept jobs 
with disamenities that natives would probably find unacceptable. The latter assumption 
would imply complementarity. That is, immigrants are viewed as workers who are 
willing to take what we can define, according to natives’ standards, as bad jobs. This is 
precisely the most common argument in favour of immigration. Meanwhile, the widely 
held popular belief that immigrant workers are willing to accept lower wages than their 
native counterparts for the same jobs, i.e. substitutability, is the primary argument 
against immigration. Although these are crucial aspects of immigration economics and 
the labour market, studies comparing the quality of jobs between immigrants and 
natives are practically non-existent. Hammermesh (1998) analysed the quality of jobs 
for immigrants and native whites, blacks and Hispanics in the US. Gazioglu and Sloane 
(1994) looked for the existence of compensating wage differentials for job disamenities 
in the immigrant workforce in the UK.  
In this paper we compare the working conditions of immigrants and natives in 
Catalonia. The comparison of immigrants’ working conditions in relation to their native 
counterparts is not only a useful tool in studying the extent to which immigrants and 
low-skilled native workers are complementary or substitutive, but also, in line with 
Hamermesh (1998), it allows us to contribute to the literature by moving a step away 
from the conventional approach used in previous studies. Our study uses cross-section 
data from the Health Survey of Catalonia 2006 (ESCA2006). We split native workers 
into two groups, Catalan-born and non-Catalan-born Spanish workers. The reason for 
making this distinction is that if competition exits, it is more likely that immigrants are 
competing with non-Catalan-born Spanish migrants than with Catalan-born workers. 
Most of these non-Catalan-born Spanish workers are low-skilled workers who migrated   3
to Catalonia from the poorer southern Spanish regions during the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s.  
The aim of this study is twofold. On the one hand, we estimate the effect of 
different working conditions on workers’ utility. We conduct separate analyses by 
birthplace. This analysis allows us to disentangle which working conditions natives and 
immigrants workers find (un)acceptable. According to the precondition for competition 
defined above, we find this analysis is crucial in order to determine the existence of 
competition/complementarity between native and immigrant workers. On the other 
hand, we test whether immigrants effectively suffer worse working conditions than 
natives in their jobs. The empirical analysis carried out here allows us to answer some 
interesting questions: i) Do immigrants derive a different (dis)utility than natives from 
the same job (dis)amenities?; ii) Does competition really exist?; and iii) If substitution 
exists, what is the mechanism by which such processes arise?  
In keeping with the aims described above, this paper is structured as follows. In 
section 2 we briefly overview the different waves of migration to Catalonia during the 
last few decades. Section 3 presents the conceptual framework. In section 4 we describe 
the dataset and in section 5 we present the empirical analysis. Finally, section 6 contains 
a summary and the main conclusions. 
 
2. Internal migration and immigration in Catalonia 
Catalonia is one of the seventeen Spanish regions, called Comunidades Autonomas 
(CAs) since 1978. The division of Spain into CAs is not based on a federal system like 
the Länder in Germany or the states in the US. The Spanish government is not fully 
decentralized, however, in recent years the degree of autonomy enjoyed by Spanish CAs   4
has increased remarkably. For instance, each CA can fully manage and partially govern 
its own health and education system. However, CAs cannot govern labour market or 
immigration policies. Catalonia is located in the north-east of Spain. It is similar in land 
area to Denmark, the Netherlands or Switzerland, and its population (7.3 million in 
2006) is about half that of the Netherlands, a quarter larger than the Danish population, 
the same size as the Swiss population and almost twice the Irish population. In absolute 
terms, the GDP of Catalonia is similar to that of Greece, Denmark, Ireland and Finland. 
In relative terms, GDP per capita in Catalonia is similar to that of Germany, Italy, 
France and Belgium, 30% higher than that of the EU27, 20% higher than that of the 
EU15 and 25% higher than that of Spain. The case of Catalonia is quite interesting 
because the immigrants coming from Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe over 
the last decade have met with Spanish migrants that came between the 1960s and 1980s 
from the poorer southern Spanish regions. Furthermore, Catalonia is a bilingual region 
where the Catalan language has become a considerable barrier in the labour market for 
some types of jobs.  
During the second half of the 20
th century Spain experienced a very intensive 
process of internal migration. This process was especially active between the late 1950s 
and the 1980s. Internal migration was unidirectional, from the poorer regions of 
Andalusia, Extremadura, Murcia and Galicia to the richer regions of Catalonia, Basque 
Country and Madrid.
1 The Spanish migratory flows mainly consisted of low-skilled 
workers that moved from poor rural areas to highly industrialized urban areas. These 
migratory flows affected more than four million people, of which more than one million 
ended up in Catalonia. This has led to today’s situation in which one quarter of the 
                                                 
1 See Bover.and Velilla (2002) for a historical overview of internal migration flows in Spain 
during the 20
th century.    5
workforce in Catalonia is made up of Spaniards not born in Catalonia. The primary 
problems these internal migrants face are that they are generally not well educated and 
they are an aging segment of the population. Therefore, the majority of them have not 
been able to assimilate the intensive process of technological change experienced in 
developed economies during the 1990s.  
  After four decades of intensive internal migration flows, during the last decade 
immigration from undeveloped and developing countries has also become a very 
important and controversial issue in Spain. In 1990 there were 407,647 foreign-born 
legal residents in Spain, while in 2006 this number rose to 2,804,303, of which 
approximately 25% live in Catalonia. Non-Spanish-born legal residents represent about 
8.4% of the workforce in Catalonia. Both non-Catalan-born Spanish and immigrants 
tend to be employed in low-skilled jobs. Hence, one might expect that if competition 
exists, it takes place mostly between immigrants and the non-Catalan Spanish 
population that migrated to Catalonia between the1950s and 1980s. 
In table 1 we report the distribution of occupations and industries according to 
birthplace. EU15 and Catalan-born workers report a higher rate of employment in 
managerial, professional and technical occupations (59.3 and 41.6 percent, 
respectively). African and Latin American workers report a smaller rate of occupation 
in these types of jobs (5.8 and 18.7%, respectively). African and Latin American-born 
workers show a greater propensity to be employed in low-skilled jobs (58.1 and 38.8%, 
respectively), while the smallest rate of occupation in these types of jobs is reported by 
EU15 and Catalan-born workers (12.8 and 14.9%, respectively). Data on occupation 
rates by industry show that almost 50% of African-born workers are employed in 
agriculture and construction, while this percentage is around 27% for Eastern European   6
workers and less than 20% for the remaining groups of workers. Almost 40% of Asian-
born workers are employed in the restaurant and catering or commercial sectors. 
According to the employment rates reported in table 1, Catalan- and EU15-born 
workers are more likely to be employed in the same occupations and industries. A 
similar conclusion can be reached if we compare non-Catalan-born Spanish and Eastern 
European and Latin American workers. Finally, Asian- and African-born workers tend 
to concentrate employment in very specific occupations-industries.  
  
[Insert table 1 around here] 
  
3. Conceptual framework 
As we mentioned in the introduction, one of the aims of this study is to determine 
whether immigrants and natives derive different utility from the same working 
conditions. To do so, let define Uij as the utility for a work er i in job j, which can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
ij j j i Uf ( w , C ; X )  ,  (1)
 
where wj and Cj are the earnings and the working conditions linked to a given job, 
respectively, and Xi a vector of individual characteristics. It is assumed that 
Uw=U/w>0, and that for a given working condition Ck that if UC=U/C<0 then Ck is 
a disamenity, while Ck will be an amenity if UC=U/C0. Assume now two types of 
workers, natives and immigrants, with the following utilities: 
ijm j j im Uf ( w , C ; X )  ; 
  (2)  7
ijn j j in Uf ( w , C ; X )  , 
 
where the subscripts m and n refer to immigrants and natives, respectively. As we 
mentioned previously, the precondition for the existence of competition in the labour 
market between immigrants and natives workers is that both are willing to accept jobs 
that do not differ in quality. The perception of the quality of a given job for both 
immigrants and native workers can be easily measured by calculating  /
m
Cm UU C    
and /
n
Cn UU C   . The assumption that immigrants find working conditions 
acceptable that natives find unacceptable would mean that for a given set of working 
conditions that  0
m
C U   and  0
n
C U  . The latter two conditions would imply the absence 
of competition. That is, immigrants like, or are at least are indifferent to jobs that 
natives dislike. On the contrary, if for a given set of working conditions we get  0
m
C U  , 
0
n
C U   and  0
m
C U  , or  0
n
C U  then we can conclude that competition exists, since both 
natives and immigrants like the same type of jobs. In this situation if immigrant workers 
with the same skills as their native counterparts are systematically employed in jobs 
with a larger number of disamenities, then we can conclude that they are discriminated 
against or that they have fewer opportunities in the labour market.  
The utilities expressed in equation (2) can be approached by a satisfaction 
function  () ij S  , for which  () () ij kj SS    if  () () ij kj UU    for ik  . In this study, we use 
satisfaction with working conditions as a proxy for the worker’s utility. 
 
4. Data and variables 
The data used in this paper comes from the 2006 Health Survey of Catalonia (Enquesta 
de Salut de Catalunya 2006 – ESCA2006), which was conducted by the Regional   8
Government of Catalonia. The survey contains information on a representative sample 
of individuals residing in Catalonia at the time of the survey. For the first time, in 2006 
the ESCA included a representative sample of immigrants. The share of immigrants in 
the sample is proportional to number of immigrants residing in Catalonia in 2005. 
Individuals included in the sample were randomly selected from the population registry 
of Catalonia. Illegal immigrants are therefore not eligible. 
We selected males and females, employed or self-employed, who declared 
income from labour. The sample consisted of 14,076 adults, of whom 70.47% were 
Catalan-born Spaniards (9,919), 21.93% were non-Catalan-born Spaniards (3,087) and 
7.59% were immigrants (1,070). The composition of the sample of immigrants by 
birthplace is the following: Latin America (41.59%), Africa (26.07%), EU15 and 
wealthy countries (19.62%), Central and Eastern Europe (8.41%) and Asia-Oceania 
(4.2%)
2.  
The data provides information regarding individuals and households. At the 
individual level, because this is a health survey the elicited responses mainly refer to a 
large set of health-related questions. However, the survey also contains items which 
provide socio-demographic information such as economic status and employment and, 
conveniently for the purposes of this study, it includes a large set of questions regarding 
the working conditions of the respondents.  
 
4.1. Selected variables  
The socio-demographic variables used in this study are age, gender, marital status, 
education, household size, area of residence and birth place. The information regarding 
                                                 
2 EU15 refers to the fifteen EU countries before the expansion in 2004, and the wealthy countries group 
includes the USA, Canada or Australia.   9
working conditions was based on the following ten questions: 1) Exposure to noise? 2) 
Exposure to dust? 3) Move heavy loads? 4) Repetitive movements? 5) Monotonous 
tasks? 6) Work autonomy? 7) Work too much? 8) Poor relationship with colleagues? 9) 
Poor relationship with superiors? 10) Work alone? Elicited responses are based on a 
four-point scale. The response scale was: (1) never (2) sometimes (3) often and (4) 
always. As is common when using this type of information, we have to face the 
shortcoming that the presence/absence or intensity of a given condition associated with 
the workplace is self-reported, therefore, these variables are to some extent subjective. 
We used principal component analysis to collapse these ten self-reported working 
conditions into four orthogonal factors. The first factor (factor 1) is associated with 
exposure to noise, dust and moving heavy loads; the second factor (factor 2) refers to 
the relationship with colleagues and superiors; the third factor (factor 3) refers to 
monotonous tasks and repetitive movements, and; the fourth factor (factor4) is 
associated with the degree of autonomy and the possibility of working alone. The 
variable of whether individuals think they work too much constitutes a unique factor 
and as such it is taken separately in the regression analysis. 
We also considered the risk of injury/death at the workplace as a disamenity. 
This information is not contained in the ESCA2006. However, we can construct an 
injury risk indicator using 2006 administrative data from the Ministry of Labour. Our 
injury risk index is the injury/death rate per 100 employees aggregated into 80 
occupation-industry cells (10 occupations and 8 industries). 
In addition to the set of self-reported working conditions described above, the 
survey contains other objective working conditions that, ceteris paribus, are expected to 
affect workers utility. These are the existence or lack of a labour contract, type of   10
contract (indeterminate duration, fixed-term or no contract), working time (morning, 
afternoon, night or irregular shifts), number of hours worked per week, flexibility in 
working time, occupational status (salaried or self-employed) and net monthly earnings 
(in intervals). Additionally, for the sample of immigrants, we also used a variable 
reflecting whether individuals feel discriminated against in the workplace and the 
number of years since migration to Spain (YSM). In table 2, we show a description of 
the selected variables in this analysis.  
 
[Insert table 2 around here] 
 
4.2. Descriptive statistics 
In table 3 we show summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. We found 
remarkable differences by birthplace. The non-Catalan-born Spanish workforce is 
considerably older than the Catalan-born workforce. Indeed non-Catalan-born workers  
are, on average, fairly close to retirement age. On the other hand, immigrant workers are 
much younger than both non-Catalan Spanish and Catalan workers. Immigrants report 
similar levels of educational attainment as Catalan-born workers (around 11 years of 
schooling). However, non-Catalan-born Spanish workers are less educated (8.9 years). 
Separating immigrants by birthplace reveals that Africans are the least educated (8.8 
years), while Latin American and EU15 immigrants are in fact more educated than 
Catalan-born workers (over 12 years). One relevant variable in our analysis is the years 
since migration (YSM) variable. This variable splits the sample of immigrants into two 
groups. On the one hand, there are the EU15 workers, who report an average length of 
stay of over 17.5 years. On the other hand, there are the Latin American and African   11
immigrants, who report an average length of stay of approximately 9 and 10 years, 
respectively.  
Average net monthly earnings also reveal significant differences by birthplace. 
Catalan-born workers and EU15 immigrants report practically the same earnings 
(around €1,160). Latin American and non-Catalan Spanish workers also report a similar 
level of earnings (around €1,020), while African-born workers report the lowest level of 
earnings (around €876). We also observed notable differences in the types of contracts 
held. Spanish and EU15-born workers report rates of permanent employment of over 
55%, while for African and Latin American workers these rates are 34% and 40%, 
respectively. Finally, the rates of self-employment also display quite different patterns. 
The highest rate of self-employment is reported by Catalan-born workers, around 22%, 
while the lowest rate is observed among African-born workers, around 5%. Non-
Catalan-born Spanish, Latin American and EU15-born workers report similar rates of 
self-employment, between 11% and 13%.  
Remarkable differences were also found among the working conditions 
considered in the analysis. Recall that our proxy of injury/death risk is based on the rate 
of injuries/deaths by occupation-industry cells. According to this indicator, on average, 
African-born workers tend to be employed in riskier jobs, 0.22%, while for the rest of 
the population groups the average values for this variable ranges from 0.12% for EU15 
to 0.155% for non-Catalan-born Spanish workers. The same pattern is observed if we 
consider working time flexibility. With the exception of the African-born workers, there 
are no significant differences by birthplace. Only 18.5% of African-born workers report 
enjoying flexible work hours, while for the rest of groups this percentage ranges 
between 39.6 and 47.1% for EU15 and Catalan-born workers, respectively.   12
Recall that we cluster nine of the working conditions into four orthogonal factors 
using principal component analysis. These factors were used in the regression analysis; 
however, for the descriptive analysis we used each working condition separately as they 
were elicited in the survey. For the working conditions associated with factor 1 
(exposure to dust, noise and move heavy loads), we found that Catalan-born workers 
report the lowest exposure to these on-the-job disamenities, while African-born workers 
report the highest exposure to these working conditions. There were not significant 
differences by birthplace with regard to the existence of a poor relationship with 
colleagues and superiors (factor 2). On average, Catalan and EU15 born workers are 
less likely than immigrants and non-Catalan-born Spanish workers to be engaged in 
jobs that involve monotonous tasks and repetitive movements (factor 3). African-born 
workers report the lowest levels of autonomy in their jobs (factor 4), while no 
differences among the rest of the population groups were observed. Our discrimination 
indicator revealed that almost 20% of the immigrant workers report experiencing 
discrimination in the workplace. By birthplace, the African-born workers are the most 
discriminated against (32.2%), followed by Latin Americans (16.6%), other (15.5%) 
and EU15 (11.4%). 
Finally, we also found some differences in the level of satisfaction with working 
conditions by birthplace. EU15 and Catalan-born workers are the most satisfied, 3.16 
and 3.11, respectively, followed by non-Catalan Spanish (3.01), Latin American (2.95) 
and African-born workers (2.88). 
  
[Insert table 3 around here] 
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Table 4 shows the results of the t-tests on the differences in average satisfaction by 
birthplace. No statistically significant differences were found between Catalan-born 
Spanish and EU15 workers. The same conclusions were drawn when comparing Latin 
American with African and non-Catalan-born Spanish workers. However, statistically 
significant differences in average satisfaction are observed if we compare Latin 
American with Catalan-born and EU15 workers; African with Spanish (non-Catalan- 
and Catalan-born) and EU15 workers, and; non-Catalan Spanish with Catalan-born 
Spanish and EU15 workers. 
 
[Insert table 4 around here] 
 
5. Empirical strategy and results 
5.1. Identifying workplace (dis)amenities 
One important issue is determining which of the working conditions described in 
the previous section are perceived as (dis)amenities by workers. As discussed in section 
3, we assume that a given working condition is perceived as a disamenity if it exerts a 
negative effect on a worker’s utility. We followed the conceptual framework described 
in section 3. Hence, we assume that the propensity of an individual i to report a certain 
level of satisfaction (utility) is driven by the following linear relationship:  
 
*
ii k k m m i
km




i S  is a latent outcome regarding the worker’s satisfaction and ei is a random 
error term. We consider that a given working condition Ck is considered as a disamenity 
if in the linear relationship expressed in (3), we get that k<0. We do not observe
*
i S  but   14
instead an indicator variable of the type Si=j if 
*
1 ji j S       (j=1, …, J). According to 
this observability rule, if we assume that ei is normally distributed, then equation (3) can 
be estimated by means of the conventional ordered probit model. However, we prefer 
the approach proposed in Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2006). Their approach, 
called the POLS (Probit OLS) model, involves the transformation of the response 





















where  () and () are the normal density function and the cumulative normal 
distribution, respectively. This reformulation eliminates the need to calculate marginal 
effects in an ordinal probit framework, which is a bit cumbersome. Under the POLS 
approach, equation (3) becomes: 
 
ln( ) ln( ) ln( )      ii k k m m i
km
zw C X     .  (5)
 
Equation (5) provides a straightforward interpretation of the estimated effects across 
alternative models. Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2006), show that differences in 




5.2. Estimates of job satisfaction equations 
Table 5 reports the results of the estimates of equation (5). We carried out separate 
estimates for Catalan Spanish, non-Catalan Spanish and non-Spanish workers. We 
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found that the individual characteristics that determine job satisfaction differ among 
groups of workers according to birthplace. For the Spanish-born workers (Catalan and 
non-Catalan) education does not affect job satisfaction. However, for immigrants this 
effect is negative and statistically significant. This result, combined with the fact that 
immigrants are not, on average, less educated than natives, may suggest that most 
immigrants are overeducated in relation to their jobs. As expected, we found that job 
satisfaction is U-shaped on age for Catalan-born workers; however it was not 
statistically significant for non-Catalan Spanish and immigrant workers. This result 
might indicate low job mobility, at least in terms of job quality, for non-Catalan-born 
workers. We also observed that gender is not significant in any of the population 
groups. This result we obtained for Catalonia does not coincide with the common result 
that women tend to display greater job satisfaction than men (e.g. Diaz-Serrano and 
Vieira, 2006). 
  One relevant result concerns the effect of the years since migration (YSM) 
variable for immigrant workers. Surprisingly, this variable does not exert a statistically 
significant effect on job satisfaction. To test the possibility of a differential effect of this 
variable by birthplace among immigrants, we also experimented with the interactions of 
the YSM variable with dummies for birthplace, but they turned out to be statistically 
insignificant.
4 This result is comparable to the effect of age for non-Catalan-born 
Spanish immigrants, since in both cases it suggests that satisfaction with the working 
conditions in the Catalan job market do not improve over time for these population 
groups. In the immigrants’ satisfaction equation, we also include a proxy for “perceived 
on-the-job discrimination”. This variable is a four-point ordinal scale. We transform this 
                                                 
4 The results of the interaction terms between years of residence and origin are not included in table 4.   16
variable into a binary indicator that takes the value of one if the immigrant worker 
answers that he(she) feels discriminated against at work (constantly, often or 
sometimes) and zero if the worker declares that he(she) or she has never felt 
discriminated against. The effect of this variable proved statistically significant and 
negative. Our results indicate that for those who feel discriminated against at work, 
satisfaction with their working conditions decreases to around 14.4 percent. 
  The results on the effect of particular working conditions on job satisfaction are 
reported in table 4 and are quite revealing. While job amenities tend to have the 
expected effect in all population groups, we find some striking differences in the case of 
job disamenities. Job satisfaction is negatively affected by the existence of poor 
environmental conditions (factor 1) for Spanish workers (Catalan and non-Catalan), 
while it is not for immigrants. Poor relations with superiors and colleagues (factor 2) 
and the execution of tedious tasks (factor 3) exert a significant negative effect on 
satisfaction in all population groups. This effect is statistically significant and similar in 
magnitude by birth place, though the effect of factor 3 is remarkably stronger that the 
effect of factor 2. Autonomy in the workplace (factor 4) exerts a positive and 
statistically significant effect on workers’ satisfaction only for the Spanish-born workers 
(Catalan and non-Catalan), while enjoying flexible working hours positively affects job 
satisfaction for all workers. This effect is similar in magnitude in all population groups. 
The feeling of working too much also generates disutility to all groups of workers. The 
effect is remarkably larger for the sample of immigrants than for Spanish-born workers. 
Surprisingly, being employed in a job with high risk of injury causes dissatisfaction to 
Spanish-born workers, but does not to immigrants. This result is quite revealing, since it   17
suggests that immigrants either have a different perception of risk or are more risk-
tolerant.
5 
Contract type and the working times also proved significant in determining job 
satisfaction. Not having a permanent/indefinite contract (fixed-term or no contract) 
exerts a negative effect on job satisfaction similar in magnitude for both Spanish and 
immigrant workers. Working at night generates dissatisfaction in all workers, while 
working with irregular or changing shifts only (negatively) affects job satisfaction for 
Spanish-born workers. The negative effect of working at night on workers’ utility is 
remarkably larger for immigrants than for Spanish-born workers. Finally, regarding 
location dummies, we observe that workers located in the area of Barcelona city report 
lower job satisfaction than those located in the rest of Catalonia.    
  The results obtained in this section allow us to conclude that immigrant workers 
and native-born workers may perceive some working conditions differently. That is, 
immigrants may accept some working conditions that natives find unacceptable. For 
instance, the risk of injury, the exposure to poor environmental working conditions, a 
lack of autonomy in the workplace, not having a permanent contract and working at 
irregular times or changing shifts exert a negative effect on native workers’ utility, 
whereas they are not statistically significant in the estimates of immigrant workers’ 
satisfaction equations. This result may suggest that if competition between immigrants 
and Spanish-born workers exists, this is limited. 
 
[Insert table 5 around here] 
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5.3. Estimates of working conditions equations 
In this section we examine whether on-the-job amenity packages received by natives 
differ from those received by their immigrant counterparts, and whether there is a catch-
up process for immigrants in terms of job quality compared to natives. That is, we 
extend the conventional immigrant assimilation analysis to immigrants’ working 
conditions. In section 3.2 (table 2), we described a separate descriptive analysis by 
birthplace of individual working conditions, however, the package of on-the-job 
(dis)amenities is mostly inherent in one’s choice of labour supply, which in turn 
depends on socio-demographic and economic factors, among other things. Therefore, in 
order to test whether immigrants and natives enjoy different working conditions, we had 
to control for the set of workers’ demographic characteristics. We did this by estimating 
the probability of enjoying/suffering a given good/bad working condition holding age, 
education, marital status and family size constant. Additionally, we conducted a 
separate analysis for immigrants and included as a covariate the years since migration to 
Spain (YSM) variable, which allowed us to test for immigrant assimilation in terms of 
job quality.  
  We did separate estimates for Catalan-born, non-Catalan-born Spanish and non-
Spanish-born workers.
6 Recall that according to the results reported by the estimates of 
the satisfaction equations, we consider on-the-job disamenities to be the following 
working conditions: fixed-term contract, working without contract, working in an 
occupation-industry with higher risk of injury/accident, working at night or with 
irregular shifts, poor environmental conditions (factor 1), poor relations with colleagues 
and superiors (factor 2), repetitive and monotonous tasks (factor 3) and working too 
                                                 
6 For the full sample we only show the estimated effect for the birthplace dummies, however, full 
estimates are available from the author upon request.    19
much. Additionally, for immigrants we also considered the perception of being 
discriminated against in the workplace as a disamenity. Following the same criteria, we 
assume as amenities: having a permanent or indeterminate duration contract, working  
the morning or morning/afternoon shift, enjoying flexible working times and autonomy 
in the workplace (factor 4). We used the conventional probit model when the outcome 
variable was binary and the linear regression model otherwise. In the separate equations 
for immigrants, we also included the variable of whether the worker feels discriminated 
against in the workplace as a covariate. We include this variable in order to control for 
the extent to which immigrants who feel discriminated against might exaggerate the 
level of disamenities they suffer in the workplace (Hamermesh, 1978). This 
misperception of the working conditions might introduce some bias in the measurement 
of our outcome variable, and hence, also potentially bias the estimated effects of the 
covariates. 
In tables A1 to A5 in the annex, we report the results of the estimates of the 
probit and linear regression models using the working condition determinants 
mentioned above. In order to allow for comparisons across alternative models, for the 
probit models we report estimated marginal effects instead of estimated coefficients. 
Statistical significance was assessed at 5%.  
 
5.3.1. Differences in working conditions by birthplace
7 
Once we controlled for socio-economic factors, we found that non-Catalan-born 
Spanish workers tend to experience worse working conditions than their similar 
Catalan-born counterparts. More specifically, this group of workers is more likely: to 
                                                 
7 Birthplace dummies are presented in table A1-A5 in the column labelled as Catalan, however, the 
estimated coefficients regarding these dummies are estimated using the full sample.    20
work without a contract (1.1%), to enjoy less flexibility and autonomy in the workplace 
(-9.6%), to be exposed to worse environmental conditions (9.9%) and to perform more 
monotonous tasks than Catalan-born workers (14.8%).
8 Comparing now Catalan-born 
workers with non-Spanish-born workers, we observe that the working conditions of  
EU15-born workers do not differ significantly from those of Catalan-born workers. This 
result indicates that EU15 immigrants are employed in more highly skilled jobs than 
other groups of immigrants, and that this group of workers are in direct competition 
with Catalan-born workers for the same type of jobs. Surprisingly, we also found that 
Latin American-born workers enjoy better working conditions than non-Catalan-born 
Spanish workers in some aspects such as flexibility in working times (-9.2 vs. 4.4%, 
respectively), poor environmental conditions (0 vs. 9.9%) and autonomy in the 
workplace (0 vs. 10.9%). Meanwhile, in other aspects such as holding a permanent 
contract (-20.1 vs. 5.5%), working without a contract (6 vs. 1.1%) and performing 
monotonous tasks in the workplace (26.6 vs. 14.8%), Latin American immigrants report 
worse working conditions than non-Catalan Spaniards. Comparing Latin American 
workers with their Catalan and EU15-born counterparts, we find that Latin American 
immigrants suffer worse working conditions in only two aspects (permanent contract 
and monotonous tasks), whereas non-Catalan-born Spanish workers experience more 
negative working conditions than their Catalan counterparts in five different aspects. In 
order to test whether recent Latin American immigrants differ from their earlier 
counterparts, we interacted the dummy variable for Latin America with dummy 
variables for years since migration.
9 We did this for working conditions that did not 
significantly differ between Latin American and Catalan-born workers, i.e. risk of 
                                                 
8 All the percentages mentioned in section 4.3.1 are the estimated marginal effects for the birthplace 
dummies in the working conditions equations taking as base category the Catalan-born workers.  
9 These results are not reported but are available from the author upon request.   21
injury, flexibility in working times, poor environmental conditions, autonomy in the 
workplace and working too much. This analysis showed that neither early nor recent 
Latin American immigrants differ from native Catalan-born workers in their adjusted 
propensities in the working conditions mentioned above.  
African-born workers suffer the worst working conditions in practically all the 
aspects studied. For instance, this group of workers is the only one that, after controlling 
for socio-demographic characteristics, still reports statistically significant differences in 
the risk of injury/death variable (16.4%) compared to other groups of workers, whether 
natives or not. Estimated coefficients for African-born dummies are always larger than 
for native and non-native workers, though regarding contractual conditions, African and 
Latin American-born workers are in a similar situation. Differences in working 
conditions are especially important for flexibility in working times, risk of injury, poor 
environmental conditions, poor relations with colleagues/superiors and autonomy in the 
workplace.  
 
5.3.2. The effect of socio-demographic variables 
This section describes the estimated coefficients for socio-demographic 
variables. We obtained the expected result that better educated workers enjoy better 
working conditions, i.e. we estimated a positive sign for the set of amenities and 
negative for disamenities. The only exceptions to this general result were: poor relations 
in the work place for non-Catalan-born workers, autonomy in the work place for   
Catalan-born workers and working too much for non-Catalan-born Spanish workers. 
Age is statistically significant in all (dis)amenities only for Catalan-born workers. This 
effect tends to be U-shaped for the set of amenities and inverted U-shaped or linear   22
negative for the set of disamenities. For non-Catalan-born Spanish workers, age exerts a 
statistically significant and linear effect only for contract type (permanent and without 
contract) and autonomy in the workplace. For immigrants, age is even more irrelevant, 
as this variable was found to be statistically significant only for the factor associated 
with poor relationships with colleagues. This effect is inverted U-shaped. Women are 
more likely to work without a contract, in less risky occupation-industries, with better 
environmental conditions, and in jobs that involve more monotonous tasks. Regarding 
the effect of household size and marital status, we found that these variables do not 
exert a significant effect in determining individuals’ working conditions for any 
population group. 
  
5.3.3. Assimilation and discrimination 
For immigrant workers, the variable reflecting the extent to which they feel 
discriminated against was found to be statistically significant only in some of the 
working condition equations. This variable tends to exert a statistically significant effect 
mostly on self-reported working conditions, which confirms the notion mentioned 
previously that workers who feel discriminated against may exaggerate the extent to 
which they are exposed to job disamenities. In our case, immigrant workers who feel 
discriminated against in the workplace are less likely to have a permanent contract, 
more likely to report poor relations with superiors and colleagues and claim to work too 
much. If we set statistical significance at 10%, discrimination also becomes significant 
in the equation regarding poor environmental conditions. 
Our results also indicate that there is a certain degree of assimilation of 
immigrant workers in terms of job quality. The number of years since migration to   23
Spain (YSM) increases the probability of having a permanent contract, enjoying 
flexibility in working times and autonomy in the workplace, whereas it reduces the 
probability of performing monotonous tasks in the workplace, working without a 
contract and feeling discriminated against in the workplace. The variable YSM does not 
exert a statistically significant effect on the probability of working in a risky 
occupation-industry, while the effect of experiencing poor environmental conditions and 
the feeling of working too much is inverted U-shaped. That is, these variables increase 
with YSM but at a decreasing rate. We found the two former results might indicate that 
while immigrants may improve their legal (type of contract) and emotional 
(relationships) working conditions with YSM, they may experience low job mobility. 
That is, immigrant workers employed in low-skilled jobs in construction or agriculture 
may experience difficulties in moving to better jobs. 
 
6. Summary and concluding remarks 
The claim that immigrants take jobs away from natives is one of the main arguments 
against immigration. And, not surprisingly, this claim becomes even stronger in periods 
of higher unemployment. The conventional approach to analysing the effect of 
immigration on natives’ labour outcomes has mainly focused on: i) measuring the 
degree of substitution between natives and immigrants, and; ii) the effect of 
immigration on native earnings. As did Hammermesh (1998), we have taken an 
alternative approach and tested whether the preconditions for direct competition 
between natives and immigrants exist. That is, we tested whether: i) immigrants display 
a preference for the same type of jobs as natives, and; ii) immigrants accept jobs, in 
terms of quality, that natives tend to refuse. Our results are quite revealing: we found   24
that the taste for job (dis)amenities between natives and immigrants may differ, or at 
least they have a different perception of the same (dis)amenities. Having a permanent 
contract, working at irregular times or changing shifts, working in jobs with a higher 
risk of injury, higher exposure to poor environmental conditions and lower degree of 
autonomy do not exert a significant effect on immigrants’ job satisfaction, whereas they 
do on natives’ satisfaction. Only non-Catalan Spaniards have shown indifference to 
working at night and in jobs with a higher risk of injury. 
Given these differences, one may think that immigrants are likely to find some 
jobs acceptable that natives would find unacceptable, at least in the early years after 
their arrival in Spain. Natives tend to enjoy better contractual conditions than 
immigrants, though this situation tends to improve with years since migration to Spain. 
Regarding the remaining working conditions, we found that EU15 and Catalan-born 
workers are employed in jobs with the same amenities, which suggest that they are 
direct competitors in the Catalan labour market. On the other hand, African-born 
immigrants suffer the worst working conditions of all the groups of workers. This 
situation may be caused by the fact that they are mainly employed in construction and 
agriculture. It is interesting that non-Catalan Spaniards face worse working conditions 
than their Catalan-born counterparts. However, the set of on-the-job amenities 
experienced by non-Catalan Spaniards and Latin Americans are fairly similar, what also 
suggests that they might compete, at least partially, in the Catalan labour market. These 
results indicate that there is a degree of competition between natives and immigrants, 
but it is limited. Our estimates suggest that competition for high-skilled jobs exists 
between Catalan and EU15 workers, while Latin American and non-Catalan natives 
might compete for lower-skilled jobs. Finally, African-born workers do not seem to be   25
in competition with other groups of workers, since they tend to take jobs that native, 
especially Catalan, and even other groups of immigrants are unwilling to take.  
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Table 1: Distribution of employment by occupation and industry by birth of place 









Occupations  Managers 8.74 12.59 2.22 3.94 18.56 8.00 12.92
  Professionals 8.71 15.27 1.66 7.63 24.74 15.88 5.63
  Technicians 8.87 13.75 1.94 7.19 16.00 7.06 7.71
  Clerical 6.98 9.92 2.72 7.04 5.72 3.41 3.75
  Restoration, services and commerce  12.76 11.48 9.32 20.31 9.30 14.59 25.31
  White-collar 12.55 10.99 12.83 6.71 5.63 12.00 4.06
  Operators 16.51 11.04 11.19 8.33 7.21 12.59 11.35
  Blue-collar 24.87 14.97 58.11 38.85 12.84 26.47 29.27
 
Industry  Agriculture & fishing  1.46 4.04 13.88 0.97 1.72 10.82 3.65
  Mining 0.06 0.09   0.12 0.14    
  Manufacturing 27.57 23.35 21.54 14.92 20.65 19.76 19.27
  Construction 15.58 10.23 35.50 15.37 8.56 16.71 8.23
  Hostelry and commerce  18.54 20.06 15.87 24.02 21.12 18.00 39.17
  Transport, communications and finance  10.29 10.57 2.18 6.49 10.93 8.94 10.00
  Real estate and corporate services  11.87 14.27 3.54 9.40 15.12 9.65 3.75
  Education & health  9.49 13.46 1.83 8.28 16.42 8.47 6.35
  Other services  5.13 3.92 5.67 20.43 5.35 7.65 9.58
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Table 2: Description of the variables 
Variable   Description 
Demographic characteristics   
Age  
Gender  
Years of schooling   
Married  Dummy variable takes the value 1 if the individual is married 
Children   Number of individuals younger than 14 years old living in the household 
Years since migration (YSM)   Years since the individual arrived in Spain 
Birth place   
Catalan   Dummy variable takes the value 1 if the individual was born in Catalonia 
Non-Catalan Spanish 
 Dummy variable takes the value 1 if the individual was born in Spain outside of 
Catalonia 
African   Dummy variable takes the value 1 if the individual was born in Africa 




 Dummy variable takes the value 1 if the individual was born in one of the 15 countries  
 of the EU before the enlargement of 2004; wealthy countries such as Canada,  
 USA or Australia are also considered in this group 
Other 
 
 Dummy variable takes the value 1 if the individual was born in Asia, Oceania, Central  
or Eastern Europe 
   
Objective working conditions   
Weekly hours   Number of hours worked per week 
Net monthly earnings   Individual net monthly earnings intervals  
Working times 
 
 FT Intensive morning; FT Intensive afternoon/evening; FT Intensive night; FT  
 Changing shift; FT Irregular/variable shifts; Part-time; Other 
Type of contract   Permanent; Indeterminate duration; Fixed-term; Self-employed; No contract; Other 
Risk of injury/death 
 
 Percentage of workers that suffered an injury or death of all workers in each  
 occupation-education cell (see table 1 for occupations and industries). 
   
Subjective working conditions  
Flexible working times   Flexibility in working times? (Yes/No) 
Working too much   Work too much? (1. Never; 2. Sometimes; 3. Often; 4. Always) 
Noise   Exposure to noise? (1. Never; 2. Sometimes; 3. Often; 4. Always) 
Dust   Exposure to dust? (1. Never; 2. Sometimes; 3. Often; 4. Always) 
Heavy   Move heavy loads? (1. Never; 2. Sometimes; 3. Often; 4. Always) 
Repetitive  
 Work tasks involve repetitive movements? (1. Never; 2. Sometimes; 3. Often; 4. 
Always) 
Monotonous   Work involves monotonous tasks? (1. Never; 2. Sometimes; 3. Often; 4. Always) 
Autonomy    Autonomy in the work place? (1. Never; 2. Sometimes; 3. Often; 4. Always) 
Alone   Work task involves working alone? (1. Never; 2. Sometimes; 3. Often; 4. Always) 
Colleagues   Poor relationship with colleagues? (1. Never; 2. Sometimes; 3. Often; 4. Always) 
Superiors   Poor relationship with superiors? (1. Never; 2. Sometimes; 3. Often; 4. Always) 
Discrimination 
 
 Only for immigrants. Do you feel discriminated against at work? (1. Never; 2. 
Sometimes; 3. Often; 4. Always) 
  
Job Satisfaction  
 
 Satisfaction with the working conditions? (1. Very dissatisfied; 2. Dissatisfied;  
 3. Satisfied; 4. Very satisfied) 
Note: FT – Full time   31
 Table 3: Summary statistics 
Spanish Immigrant   Full  sample
Catalan-born Non Catalan-born Non Spanish-born   
 Mean  S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean  S.D.    Mean S.D.
Individual characteristics           
Age 45.402  18.623  57.389 15.346  37.848  13.331    47.457 18.470
Years of schooling  11.105  3.373  8.900 3.686  11.320  3.796   10.638 3.598
Women 0.474  0.499  0.477 0.500  0.428  0.495    0.471 0.499
Household size  3.062  1.203  2.853 1.139  3.552  1.585   3.054 1.234
Years living in Spain              11.432  13.586   11.432 13.586
Job characteristics           
Monthly net earnings(€)
1 1,168.96  780.09  1,039.21 663.28  1,015.88  617.59    1,127.98 746.24
Weekly hours worked  40.729  10.180  40.657 8.981  40.485  10.718   40.695 9.981
Permanent contract  0.590  0.492  0.672 0.470  0.438  0.496   0.596 0.491
Fixed-term contract  0.151  0.358  0.113 0.316  0.374  0.484   0.160 0.366
Without contract   0.035  0.183  0.076 0.266  0.084  0.278   0.048 0.213
Self-employed 0.220  0.415  0.135 0.342  0.103  0.304    0.193 0.395
Working conditions           
Flexible working times  0.471  0.499  0.388 0.487  0.355  0.479   0.446 0.497
Risk of injury   0.154  0.189  0.155 0.160  0.157  0.172   0.155 0.182
Work too much
2   2.223  1.015  2.320 1.079  2.215  1.013   2.238 1.026
Factor 1           
Exposure to noise
2 1.604  0.900  1.757 0.997  1.736  1.001    1.642 0.928
Exposure to dust
2 1.598  0.973  1.767 1.069  1.796  1.077    1.644 1.002
Move heavy loads
2   1.599  0.929  1.698 0.982  1.754  1.014   1.630 0.948
Factor 2           
Poor relationship with colleagues
2 2.317 1.184  2.576 1.193  2.489 1.178    2.375 1.189
Poor relationship with superiors
2 1.925  1.094 2.226 1.208 2.252  1.133   2.005 1.125
Factor 3           
Repetitive movements
2 2.028  1.129  2.049 1.171  2.002  1.138    2.029 1.137
Monotonous tasks
2 2.872  1.139  2.797 1.176  2.452  1.205    2.820 1.158
Factor 4           
Work alone
2 1.100  0.438  1.129 0.507  1.136  0.501    1.108 0.456
Work autonomy
2 1.115  0.447  1.130 0.494  1.146  0.524    1.120 0.463
            
Discrimination       0.195  0.239   
Satisfaction working conditions
3 3.111  0.620 3.016 0.615 3.004  0.680   3.085 0.626
Notes: (1) This variable is in intervals. We considered the wage to be the middle point of the salary interval reported by the respondent.  
(2) The codes for the variable are: 1. Never; 2. Sometimes; 3. Often; 4. Always  
(3) The codes for the variable are: 1. Very dissatisfied; 2. Dissatisfied;  3. Satisfied; 4. Very satisfied 
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Table 3 (Continuation) 
  African Latin American European Union    Other origin
 Mean  S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean  S.D.    Mean S.D.
Individual characteristics           
Age 35.498  11.291  37.357 12.440  41.292  16.182    36.291 10.765
Years of schooling  8.824  4.162  12.427 3.158  12.045  3.316   11.036 3.226
Women 0.258  0.438  0.499 0.501  0.498  0.501    0.345 0.480
Household size  3.928  1.818  3.578 1.503  3.024  1.293   4.182 1.611
Years living in Spain  9.781  9.428  8.833 11.609  17.679  18.105   7.818 5.941
Job characteristics           
Monthly net earnings(€)
1 876.75  393.03  1,019.74 566.20  1,161.22  835.51    925.00 454.27
Weekly hours worked  40.249  10.128  40.452 11.645  40.689  9.395   40.857 11.946
Permanent contract  0.344  0.476  0.409 0.492  0.567  0.496   0.473 0.504
Fixed-term contract  0.509  0.501  0.389 0.488  0.237  0.426   0.291 0.458
Without contract   0.097  0.296  0.090 0.286  0.069  0.253   0.055 0.229
Self-employed 0.050  0.219  0.110 0.313  0.127  0.334    0.182 0.389
Working conditions           
Flexible working times  0.185  0.389  0.429 0.496  0.396  0.490   0.383 0.491
Risk of injury   0.228  0.199  0.129 0.154  0.124  0.145   0.159 0.171
Work too much
2   2.439  1.003  2.196 1.007  2.101  1.022   1.833 0.853
Factor 1           
Exposure to noise
2 1.976  1.055  1.587 0.921  1.779  1.044    1.571 0.914
Exposure to dust
2 2.094  1.127  1.712 1.047  1.668  1.041    1.667 1.004
Move heavy loads
2   2.212  1.065  1.578 0.940  1.645  0.985   1.500 0.804
Factor 2           
Poor relation colleagues
2 1.179  0.628  1.101 0.368  1.120  0.466    1.310 0.811
Poor relation superiors
2 1.203  0.647  1.115 0.411  1.111  0.478    1.310 0.811
Factor 3           
Repetitive movements
2 2.693  1.055  2.466 1.206  2.364  1.221    2.286 1.195
Monotonous tasks
2 2.415  1.043  2.240 1.180  2.088  1.133    2.381 1.058
Factor 4           
Work alone
2 1.802  1.016  2.128 1.181  2.046  1.182    1.714 0.944
Work autonomy
2 1.887  1.024  2.654 1.206  2.719  1.182    2.214 1.200
            
Discrimination 0.322  0.468  0.166 0.373  0.114  0.319    0.155 0.364
Satisfaction working conditions
3 2.887  0.686 2.958 0.695 3.166  0.631    3.143 0.608
Notes: (1) This variable is in intervals. We considered the wage to be the middle point of the salary interval reported by the 
respondent.  
(2) The codes for the variable are: 1. Never; 2. Sometimes; 3. Often; 4. Always  
(3) The codes for the variable are: 1. Very dissatisfied; 2. Dissatisfied;  3. Satisfied; 4. Very satisfied 
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Table 4: Test of the difference in average job satisfaction by origin 
 
Catalan Spanish Non-Catalan 
Spanish 
African   Latin  American
 Diff.  t-stat.  Diff.  t-stat. Diff.  t-stat.    Diff.  t-stat. 
Non-Catalan Spanish  -0.095  -5.307              
African -0.224  -5.167 -0.129 -2.811          
Latin American  -0.153  -4.517 -0.058 -1.549 0.071  1.189       
EU15  0.055  1.282  0.151 3.341 0.279  4.387  0.208 3.597 
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Table 5: POLS estimates of working condition satisfaction equations 
 Spanish-Born    Non-Spanish  born
 Catalan  Non-Catalan     
  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat   Coeff.  t-stat
Constant 5.080 6.34  3.412 1.37    4.959  1.78
Individual characteristics               
log(Years of schooling)  0.022 0.68  0.037 0.64   -0.163  -2.89
log(age) -1.344 -2.95  -0.380 -0.28    -0.970  -0.61
log(age) squared  0.181 2.83  0.045 0.25   0.145  0.64
log(arrival)            -0.009  -0.29
woman -0.007 -0.47  0.017 0.50    -0.035  -0.72
Contract (base: permanent/ indefinite)               
Fixed-term contract  -0.060 -2.81  -0.084 -1.76   -0.068  -1.39
Without contract  -0.210 -3.79  -0.251 -2.53   -0.206  -2.28
Self-employed 0.081 4.29  0.029 0.68    0.110  1.47
Other -0.176 -1.61  0.192 0.71    0.309  0.53
Working time (base: fulltime split shift)               
Fulltime morning shift  0.000 0.02  -0.029 -0.78   -0.012  -0.21
Fulltime evening shift  -0.027 -0.74  -0.075 -1.09   -0.034  -0.39
Fulltime night shift  -0.115 -2.34  -0.112 -1.27   -0.396  -3.31
Fulltime rotation shift  -0.013 -0.47  0.021 0.36   -0.072  -0.93
Fulltime Irregular or changing shift  -0.061 -2.74  -0.140 -2.90   -0.048  -0.64
Part-time -0.022 -0.29  0.109 0.62    -0.294  -1.41
Working conditions               
log(weekly hours worked)  -0.035 -1.87  -0.058 -1.31   -0.064  -1.19
Risk of injury  -0.122 -2.82  -0.159 -1.53   -0.019  -0.15
Flexible working times  0.129 8.68  0.094 2.89   0.120  2.49
Factor 1 (dust. noise. move loads)  -0.043 -5.60  -0.050 -3.25   -0.003  -0.13
Factor 2 (Rel. colleagues and superiors)  -0.065 -9.17  -0.045 -3.49   -0.051  -2.76
Factor 3 (Repetitive. monotonous tasks)  -0.100 -12.62  -0.093 -5.81   -0.076  -3.20
Factor 4 (Flexibility. working alone) 0.025 3.39  0.042 2.82    0.014  0.63
Work too much  -0.064 -7.57  -0.073 -4.22   -0.137  -5.15
Discriminated against at work              -0.144  -3.23
Sub-region (base: Lleida)               
Tarragona 0.016 0.58  0.134 2.17    0.173  1.87
Tortosa 0.104 3.31  0.205 2.24    0.001  0.01
Girona -0.001 -0.04  0.112 1.85    -0.009  -0.11
Costa de Ponent  -0.052 -2.17  -0.038 -0.73   -0.129  -1.69
Barcelones Nord and Maresme  -0.079 -2.59  -0.067 -1.05   -0.246  -2.44
Centre -0.103 -4.54  -0.026 -0.48    -0.176  -2.36
Barcelona City  -0.151 -6.13  -0.025 -0.44   -0.155  -2.16
Origin (base: African)               
Latin  American            0.063  1.04
EU15            0.139  1.90
Central and Eastern Europe               0.219  2.56
Other              0.138  1.22
R-squared (adjusted)  0.132    0.121    0.170 
N 6.590    1.447    823 
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Table A1: Estimates of the working condition equations (Probit) 






m.e. z-val. m.e. z-val. m.e. z-val.  m.e. z-val. m.e. z-val. m.e. z-val.
Years schooling  0.010 5.71 0.014 4.85 0.015 3.25  -0.004 -9.25 -0.005 -6.98 -0.013 -6.10
Age 0.019 10.53 0.003 3.23 0.002 0.92  -0.002 -5.00 0.001 3.35 0.000 -0.32
Age  squared  0.000 -10.68       0.000 5.37      
YSM         0.003 2.04        -0.005 -3.14
YSM  squared                  0.000 2.38
Woman -0.004 -0.34 -0.145 -8.21 -0.052 -1.57  0.045 13.53 0.109 11.46 0.091 5.54
Household size  -0.024 -5.44 -0.002 -0.27 -0.004 -0.35  0.000 0.50 0.000 0.19 0.002 0.40
Married 0.063 4.39 0.045 1.54 0.072 1.92  -0.007 -2.04 0.003 0.43 -0.021 -1.33
Widow 0.036 1.35 -0.029 -0.69 0.044 0.35  -0.006 -1.47 0.007 0.67 0.075 1.13
Separated 0.029 0.87 -0.030 -0.58 0.007 0.07  0.001 0.10 -0.009 -0.84 0.069 1.46
Divorced -0.036 -0.89 0.012 0.18 0.118 1.25  -0.002 -0.26 0.000 0.00    
Discrimination  -0.127 -3.10        0.002 0.09
Tarragona 0.096 4.78 0.018 0.48 -0.120 -1.73  -0.002 -0.38 0.006 0.52 0.047 1.27
Tortosa 0.003 0.15 -0.044 -0.76 -0.112 -1.42  -0.003 -0.67 -0.001 -0.07 0.110 2.38
Girona 0.118 6.63 0.002 0.05 -0.013 -0.21  -0.006 -1.66 0.005 0.49 0.005 0.17
Costa de Ponent  0.138 7.97 0.058 1.86 0.074 1.28  -0.005 -1.32 0.016 1.70 0.021 0.74
Barcelones Nord - Maresme  0.118 5.34 -0.013 -0.35 -0.055 -0.74  -0.004 -0.88 0.010 0.94 -0.007 -0.21
Centre 0.159 9.83 0.076 2.40 0.043 0.75  -0.003 -0.85 0.008 0.89 0.070 2.23
Barcelona City  0.162 9.50 0.036 1.10 -0.045 -0.86  0.007 1.68 0.016 1.64 0.031 1.22
Non-Catalan-born Spanish
(1)  0.055 4.96       0.011 3.96      
African
(1)  -0.211 -6.63    -0.159 -3.07  0.058 5.18    -0.025 -1.17
Latin American
(1)  -0.201 -8.11    -0.149 -3.19  0.060 6.67    -0.011 -0.54
EU15 and wealthy countries
(1)  0.003 0.10       0.047 3.73      
Other
(1)  -0.111 -2.55    -0.053 -0.89  0.036 2.43    -0.037 -1.78
Log-likelihood    -6449  -1880  -6811  -1260  -5920  -2501
Sample  size    9916  3087  1065    9916  3087  1032
Pseudo-R
2    0.039  0.038  0.066    0.157  0.289  0.179
    Notes:  (1)  Estimated  effects  regarding birthplace dummies are obtained from the estimates using the full-sample. m.e. refers to marginal effects. 
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Table A2: Estimates of the working condition equations (probit) 







 m.e. t-val. m.e. t-val. m.e. t-val. m.e. z-val. m.e. z-val. m.e. z-val. 
Years schooling  -0.022 -14.36 -0.019 -7.13 -0.016 -3.79 0.021 9.64 0.014 3.33 0.018 3.30 
Age -0.003 -1.83 0.000 -0.49 0.002 1.24 0.004 5.23 0.002 1.64 0.002 0.85 
Age squared  0.000 2.10            
YSM -0.002 -1.21         0.005 2.24 
YSM squared           
Woman -0.291 -32.11 -0.305 -18.13 -0.361 -11.58 -0.067 -5.30 0.025 0.93 0.007 0.18 
Household size  0.006 1.47 0.003 0.45 0.013 1.26 0.000 0.09 -0.006 -0.46 0.004 0.36 
Married -0.005 -0.44 -0.027 -0.97 -0.065 -1.84 0.031 1.94 -0.005 -0.11 -0.003 -0.08 
Widow 0.055 2.27 0.006 0.15 0.070 0.57 0.093 1.44 0.034 0.34 -0.166 -0.98 
Separated 0.013 0.43 -0.040 -0.81 -0.108 -1.10 0.001 0.02 -0.005 -0.07 0.173 1.60 
Divorced -0.010 -0.28 -0.028 -0.46 -0.059 -0.62 0.068 1.44 -0.128 -1.47 -0.043 -0.44 
Discrimination 0.007 0.19         -0.008 -0.16 
Tarragona -0.050 -3.06 -0.023 -0.70 -0.134 -2.35 -0.023 -0.89 0.033 0.58 0.197 2.43 
Tortosa 0.040 2.16 -0.086 -1.84 0.112 1.45 0.061 2.12 0.086 1.02 0.010 0.11 
Girona -0.062 -4.33 -0.066 -2.12 -0.169 -3.67 -0.009 -0.39 0.078 1.39 0.084 1.22 
Costa de Ponent  -0.069 -4.87 -0.105 -3.96 -0.122 -2.53 -0.007 -0.34 0.091 1.90 -0.015 -0.23 
Barcelones Nord - Maresme  -0.105 -6.10 -0.064 -2.04 -0.197 -3.66 -0.102 -3.67 0.110 1.88 0.095 1.06 
Centre -0.061 -4.63 -0.098 -3.62 -0.185 -4.15 -0.070 -3.39 0.067 1.36 0.071 1.09 
Barcelona City  -0.104 -7.58 -0.095 -3.41 -0.175 -3.93 -0.021 -0.94 0.062 1.19 0.167 2.77 
Non-Catalan-born Spanish
(1) -0.016 -1.68     -0.092 -6.01        
African
(1) 0.164 5.79     0.177 3.37 -0.244 -6.71     -0.176 -3.14 
Latin American
(1) 0.035 1.58    0.007 0.14 -0.044 -1.61     0.017 0.33 
EU15 and wealthy countries
(1) 0.005 0.15     -0.019 -0.44        
Other
(1) 0.040 1.04     0.001 0.02 -0.146 -3.16     -0.066 -1.05 
Log-likelihood   -4711 -15541 -512 -4494 -9611 -4961 
Sample size    9916   3087   1065   6651   1457   836 
Pseudo-R
2   0.154   0.124   0.225   0.02   0.01   0.086 
   Notes: (1) Estimated effects regarding birthplace dummies are obtained from the estimates using the full-sample; (2) The outcome variable is a dummy variable that takes the  
       value 1 if the worker is employed in occupation-industry cell in top quartile of the injury/death distribution. m.e. refers to marginal effects.   37
 
Table A3: Estimates of the working condition equations (linear regression) 








 m.e. t-val. m.e. t-val. m.e. t-val.    m.e. t-val. m.e. t-val. m.e. t-val. 
Years schooling  -0.071 -17.81 -0.047 -5.49 -0.028 -2.57    0.012 3.00 0.004 0.41   0.018 1.49 
Age -0.008 -6.75 -0.004 -1.43 0.000 0.05    -0.001 -0.25 0.002 0.72   -0.057 -2.05 
Age  squared                   0.001 2.23 
YSM        0.030 2.27          0.001 0.22 
YSM  squared        -0.001 -2.25            
Woman -0.451 -19.42 -0.529 -9.72 -0.684 -8.93    -0.050 -2.08 -0.013 -0.22   0.024 0.28 
Household size  -0.004 -0.41 0.002 0.08 0.031 1.32    -0.005 -0.47 0.003 0.10   -0.008 -0.30 
Married 0.028 0.97 0.051 0.61 -0.011 -0.14    -0.007 -0.25 -0.023 -0.25   0.069 0.72 
Widow -0.103 -0.85 -0.134 -0.66 0.399 1.01    0.126 1.01 0.091 0.40   -0.151 -0.34 
Separated 0.089 1.24 0.168 1.22 -0.441 -2.00    -0.056 -0.75 -0.003 -0.02   0.001 0.00 
Divorced 0.105 1.19 0.091 0.50 -0.051 -0.25    0.112 1.24 -0.029 -0.15   -0.023 -0.10 
Discrimination        0.179 1.79          0.500 4.46 
Tarragona -0.072 -1.51 0.165 1.45 -0.304 -1.93    0.067 1.37 0.090 0.72   0.156 0.88 
Tortosa 0.029 0.55 0.091 0.54 0.142 0.82    0.064 1.16 -0.047 -0.25   -0.097 -0.50 
Girona 0.030 0.71 0.154 1.38 -0.189 -1.39    0.041 0.94 0.122 0.99   0.230 1.51 
Costa de Ponent  -0.025 -0.62 0.122 1.28 -0.328 -2.52    0.123 2.94 0.186 1.76   0.143 0.97 
Barcelones Nord - Maresme  -0.037 -0.73 0.209 1.80 -0.285 -1.65    0.135 2.53 0.078 0.61   0.109 0.56 
Centre 0.086 2.26 0.179 1.81 -0.256 -2.01    0.130 3.28 0.182 1.67   0.280 1.95 
Barcelona City  0.022 0.54 0.087 0.83 -0.338 -2.85    0.152 3.59 0.005 0.05   0.331 2.47 
Non-Catalan-born Spanish
(1)  0.099 3.41         0.035 1.14       
African
(1) 0.148 2.19     0.125 1.03    0.202 2.83       0.155 1.12 
Latin American
(1) -0.016 -0.30     0.000 0.00    -0.029 -0.53       -0.061 -0.49 
EU15 and wealthy countries
(1)  0.016 0.20         -0.035 -0.42       
Other
(1) -0.011 -0.13     -0.025 -0.18    0.260 2.72       0.282 1.83 
Constant 1.329 16.05 0.849 3.95 0.583 2.39    -0.199 -2.32 -0.223 -0.94   0.459 0.81 
Sample size    6618   1452   826     6618   1452    826 
Pseudo-R
2   0.110   0.089   0.156     0.006   0.005    0.032 
   Notes: (1) Estimated effects regarding birthplace dummies are obtained from the estimates using the full-sample. m.e. refers to marginal effects.   38
 
Table A4: Estimates of the working condition equations (linear regression) 








 m.e. t-val. m.e. t-val. m.e. t-val.    m.e. t-val. m.e. t-val. m.e. t-val. 
Years schooling  -0.083 -20.03 -0.092 -10.47 -0.040 -3.79    0.003 0.70 -0.015 -1.74   0.031 2.82 
Age 0.014 2.00 -0.004 -1.43 -0.001 -0.28    0.023 3.28 0.006 1.85   0.003 0.64 
Age  squared  -0.000 -2.25         -0.000 -2.13       
YSM        -0.012 -2.74          0.010 2.32 
YSM  squared                     
Woman 0.089 3.72 0.279 5.01 0.207 2.75    -0.150 -6.14 -0.077 -1.38   0.056 0.74 
Household size  -0.008 -0.80 -0.009 -0.36 0.019 0.81    0.002 0.23 -0.027 -1.05   -0.026 -1.11 
Married -0.043 -1.36 0.118 1.37 0.084 1.04    0.0428 1.28 -0.084 -0.98   0.003 0.04 
Widow 0.113 0.92 0.229 1.09 0.028 0.07    0.017 0.14 -0.160 -0.77   0.182 0.46 
Separated -0.018 -0.24 0.161 1.15 -0.129 -0.60    -0.024 -0.31 0.124 0.89   0.203 0.92 
Divorced 0.042 0.46 -0.040 -0.21 -0.047 -0.23    0.018 0.19 -0.246 -1.33   0.129 0.62 
Discrimination        0.060 0.61          -0.027 -0.27 
Tarragona 0.148 3.04 0.074 0.64 0.034 0.22    -0.147 -2.94 -0.248 -2.14   0.010 0.06 
Tortosa 0.116 2.13 -0.013 -0.08 0.144 0.84    0.000 0.00 -0.332 -1.94   0.091 0.52 
Girona 0.135 3.11 0.304 2.66 -0.033 -0.25    -0.084 -1.87 -0.260 -2.30   -0.047 -0.35 
Costa de Ponent  0.154 3.71 0.080 0.82 0.037 0.29    -0.309 -7.23 -0.243 -2.51   -0.051 -0.39 
Barcelones Nord - Maresme  0.284 5.38 0.117 0.98 -0.039 -0.23    -0.192 -3.54 -0.116 -0.98   0.262 1.51 
Centre 0.135 3.47 0.132 1.30 -0.105 -0.84    -0.141 -3.51 -0.170 -1.69   0.071 0.56 
Barcelona City  0.256 6.10 0.273 2.53 0.231 1.98    -0.186 -4.31 -0.287 -2.69   0.175 1.47 
Non-Catalan-born Spanish
(1)  0.148 4.98         -0.109 -3.60       
African
(1) 0.268 3.90     0.242 2.02    -0.649 -9.25       -0.266 -2.18 
Latin American
(1) 0.266 5.03     0.043 0.40    -0.056 -1.03       0.141 1.28 
EU15 and wealthy countries
(1)  0.060 0.75         -0.137 -1.66       
Other
(1) 0.107 1.16     -0.118 -0.88    -0.285 -3.02       -0.010 -0.07 
Constant 0.568 3.93 1.060 4.81 0.512 2.19    -0.428 -2.87 0.266 1.22   -0.779 -3.28 
Sample size    6618   1452   826     6618   1452    826 
Pseudo-R
2   0.061   0.089   0.047     0.031   0.010    0.068 
   Notes: (1) Estimated effects regarding birthplace dummies are obtained from the estimates using the full-sample. m.e. refers to marginal effects.   39
Table A5: Estimates of the working conditions equations (linear regression) 




m.e. t-val. m.e. t-val. m.e. t-val. m.e z-val
Years schooling  -0.022 -5.26 -0.006 -0.75 -0.034 -3.37 -0.008 -1.70
Age 0.031 4.54 -0.004 -1.32 0.003 0.75 -0.001 -0.29
Age squared  -0.000 -4.49            
YSM         0.022 1.84 -0.004 -2.66
YSM  squared        -0.001 -2.24   
Woman -0.155 -6.55 -0.162 -2.98 -0.028 -0.40 -0.023 -0.71
Household size  -0.015 -1.43 0.016 0.64 -0.061 -2.83 -0.034 -3.26
Married 0.063 2.03 0.114 1.36 0.217 2.88 0.044 1.22
Widow 0.054 0.44 0.192 0.94 0.078 0.22 -0.023 -0.18
Separated 0.098 1.32 0.180 1.30 -0.166 -0.82 0.222 2.27
Divorced 0.047 0.52 -0.074 -0.40 0.045 0.24 0.076 0.82
Discrimination        0.234 2.57   
Tarragona -0.013 -0.28 -0.088 -0.77 -0.023 -0.16 0.031 0.45
Tortosa -0.016 -0.29 -0.254 -1.51 -0.137 -0.85 0.159 2.00
Girona 0.075 1.75 0.152 1.37 -0.165 -1.33 -0.098 -1.67
Costa de Ponent  0.036 0.88 0.035 0.37 -0.082 -0.68 -0.010 -0.19
Barcelones Nord - Maresme  0.238 4.55 0.041 0.35 0.164 1.03 -0.142 -1.92
Centre 0.204 5.28 0.140 1.41 -0.072 -0.62 -0.082 -1.47
Barcelona City  0.178 4.28 0.103 0.98 -0.098 -0.90 0.069 1.34
Non-Catalan-born Spanish  0.025 0.86            
African 0.110 1.63     0.197 1.76 0.295 5.66
Latin American  -0.022 -0.43     0.157 1.55 0.076 1.62
EU15 and wealthy countries  -0.187 -2.36            
Other -0.121 -1.34     0.032 0.25 -0.023 -0.38
Constant 1.233 8.60 1.810 8.40 1.799 8.04 0.806 7.98
Sample size    6618   1452   826   1014
Pseudo-R
2   0.024   0.011   0.051   0.083
  Notes:  (1)  Estimated  effects  regarding  birthplace dummies are obtained from the estimates using the full-sample. m.e. refers to marginal effects. 